One important feature of tins model is that it decomposes movements in the money supply into the part that is due directly to Federal Reserve policy actions (the adjusted monetary base) and the part that is due to changes in technology and the tastes and preferences of depository institutions and the public (the money multiplier). In this decomposition, the multiplier is assumed to be independent of the policy actions of the central bank. The independence is implicitly predicated on the assumptions that the demands for both checkable deposits and currency are determined by the same factors, and that individuals can quickly and costlessly alter their holdings of currency and checkable deposits to achieve the desired proposition of the two alternative forms of money.
1 Open market purchases, for example, increase reserves and consequently checkable deposits; but the public simply shifts from checkable deposits to currency until the (unchanged) desired ratio of currency relative to checkable deposits is once again achieved. Because policy actions have no impact on the public's holdings of currency relative to checkable deposits, the multiplier does not depend directly on the policy actions of the Fed.
This article investigates the theoretical and empirical validity of the key feature of the multiplier approach. In theory, the multiplier is independent of the policy actions of the Federal Reserve only if the demands for currency and checkable deposits are determined by identical Reserve actions-implicit in the work of Brunner and Meltzer (1964, 1968) and, more recently, in Plosser (1991) -has never been demonstrated rigorously with micro-economic principles. The argument presented here that would suggest such independence is implicit in works as early as Fisher (1911) .
factors and if, conditional on these factors, these demands are strictly proportional. From an empirical perspective, this condition is necessary but not sufficient; the degree to which the multiplier is influenced by policy actions also depends on the strength of the relationship between policy actions and checkable deposits.
An empirical analysis shows that most of the variability of the observed ratio of currency to checkable deposits is due to variation in checkable deposits, and thereby suggests that the demand for currency is not strictly proportional to the demand for checkable deposits. Prior to the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA), however, the link between reserves and checkable deposits was quite loose-so much so, that the notion that the multiplier is independent of policy actions was operationally valid. Nevertheless, the empirical relevance of this notion has weakened considerably since the implementation of the MCA in the early 1980s. Since then, the relationship between Fed policy actions and checkable deposits and, thus, the multiplier has tightened markedly.
The evidence presented here, that the multiplier is not independent of Federal Reserve actions in the post-MCA period, raises some questions about the appropriateness of using the monetary base as an indicator of the effects of policy actions on the money stock. More important from a policy perspective, it also suggests a modification of the standard approach to money stock control that might yield substantial improvements in effective monetary aggregate targeting.
THE MONEY MULTIPLIER

APPROACH: A SIMPLE: EXAMPLE
As a starting point for understanding the decomposition of the money supply into the monetary base and the multiplier, note that the narrow money stock, Ml, is defined as (1) Ml, = TCD, + C,, where TCD denotes total checkable deposits and C denotes the currency held by the nonbank public. The monetary base (MB), not adjusted for changes in reserve requirements, is simply the sum of currency and reserves (including cash in the vaults of depository institutions) in the banking system, R:
(2) MB,= C,+ R,.
Currency, supplied by the Federal Reserve on demand, reflects the portfolio decisions of the public rather than monetary policy actions. Reserves, in contrast, can be affected directly by the Fed's sales or purchases of government securities in the open market.
For simplicity, assume that the Federal Reserve has a simple system of reserve requirements, with required reserves, RR, given by (3) RR,= rTClJ,, 0 -c r < 1, where r denotes the ratio of reserves that must be held against TCD.
2 A change in the reserve requirement ratio, r, also would constitute a monetary policy action by the Fed.
Furthermore, for simplicity, assume that actual reserves always equal required reserves so that excess reserves are identically zero. With this simplifying assumption, equation 3 can be rewritten as
The model is completed by assuming that currency is held in some proportion, k, of TCD. That is,
where the proportion k, hereafter called the kratio, is the public's desired ratio of currency to TCD holdings.
Combining equations 1, 2, 4 and 5 produces the monetary base-multiplier representation of the money supply:
where m, the money multiplier, is given by
According to this representation, a policy action that increases R by one dollar, through open market purchases of government securities, increases MB by one dollar and the money stock by m dollars.Ĩ n this representation, policy actions are reflected not only in MB, through changes in H, but in m, through changes in r. With a simple adjustment to MB, however, the effects of policy actions on the money supply can be isolated in one measure. This alternative measure of the monetary base, called the adjusted monetary base, AMB, reflects both changes in H and r. It is constructed by calculating the hypothetical level of reserves that would have been required under the reserve requirements in existence during a chosen base period for the current (actual) level of reservable deposits. With the chosen base period, changes in required reserves due to changes in reserve requirements, r, are added to the monetary base.S pecifically, the AMB is given by
where the reserve adjustment magnitude, HAM, is defined as (9) RAM, = (r*~.~J.)TCD,.
This adjustment measures the reserves released or absorbed by changes in r relative to r*, the required reserve ratio during the base period. In the base period, RAM is zero and AMB = MB. A decrease in r from its base-period level (r*) releases reserves into the banking system and thereby increases RAM and AMB. Conversely, an increase in r reflects the reserve drain by reducing RAM and AMB.
Combining equations 1, 4, 5, 8 and 9 yields the following decomposition of Ml, (10) Ml, = m* AMB,, where (11) m* = (l+k)I(r*+k).
In this characterization of the money supply process, all changes in monetary policy, through changes in r or H, are reflected in the AMB. Changes in the multiplier reflect only changes in the public's desire to hold currency relative to checkable deposits, changes in the k-ratio.B ecause, in this model, the k-ratio is not directly influenced by the policy actions of the Fed, the multiplier is independent of policy.
THE DEMAND FOR CURRENCYC HECKABLE DEPOSITS AND NEAR-MONIES: WHAT IS THE k-RATIO?
Interest in the currency-deposit ratio dates back to Fisher (1911) , who was concerned that the two forms of money had different income velocities. He realized that these two monies are imperfect substitutes: currency is especially useful for making small, "face-to-face" transactions, while checkable deposits provide a convenient means for making large, 'out-of-town" transactions.
Fisher reasoned, however, that individuals achieve an 'equilibrium" in their holdings of the two forms of money. The notion of a desired or optimal k-ratio is based on the assumption that individuals decide how much of their money holdings they will allocate between currency and checkable deposits, based on both the relative advantages of each in undertaking an individual's planned transactions and their relative holding cost. This ratio was assumed to be a I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 3 Note that because r< 1, m >1. If the assumption that excess reserves are not held were replaced by the assumption that they are held in a fixed proportion, e, of TCD, then the denominator of the multiplier would include e as well, so that the multiplier would be smaller than that shown in equation 7. 4 See Tatom (1980) , for example, who discusses the issue of choosing the appropriate base period in light of changes in the structure of reserve requirements. This theoretic discussion focuses on the measure of the adjusted monetary base constructed at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See Garfinkel and Thornton (1991) for a more detailed discussion of this measure and a similar one constructed by the Federal Reserve Board.
'In a slightly more realistic model, which allows for the fact that depository institutions must hold reserves on government and foreign transaction balances, m* = (I +k)l (r(1 +g+f) + k), where g and f denote the ratios of government and foreign transactions accounts to TCD, respectively. If, in addition, excess reserves were held, as described in footnote 2, m = (1 .+.k)l(r*(1 +g-i-f)+k÷e). These complications can be ignored, however, because movements in the observed ratio of currency to TCD explain most of the movements in the multiplier, as will be discussed shortly.
function of a number of economic and social variables.°G iven these variables, the demands for currency and checkable deposits were thought to be strictly proportional to each other. Moreover, because individuals are free to adjust their holdings of the two monies quickly and costlessly, it was assumed that the actual currencydeposit ratio would deviate from the desired ratio for only a short period of time.' According to this line of reasoning, all changes in the observed currency-to-deposit ratio, denoted here by the K-ratio, are to be interpreted as changes in the desired ratio caused by one of these factors. While not numerically constant, as it was assumed to be in the previous analysis, the kratio was viewed as not being directly affected by monetary policy actions.
The following discussion, supported by subsequent empirical analysis, suggests, however, that the observed ratio of currency to checkable deposits can be and has been affected directly by the policy actions of the Federal Reserve.' This effect can emerge without changing the relative advantages of currency and checkable deposits or their relative holding cost.
Substitutability, Holding Costs and the Optimal k-Ratio
There ai-e a number of reasons why one might question the assumption that changes in the observed currency-to-deposit ratio necessarily reflect changes in the optimal k-ratio-that is, changes in the relative holding cost and advantages of currency and checkable deposits. First and perhaps foremost among these is that the demand for either of these forms of money might depend on a number of special factors that are unrelated to the demand for the other. i'hus, changes in the relative advantages of these two forms of money might not be empirically important in explaining changes in the ratio of currency to checkable deposits.
For example, many believe that currency has no rival for illegal transactions. The same is true for foreign demand for U.S. currency by countries that need "hard currencies" for their domestic transactions.' To the extent that currency is held for these reasons, independent of factors that determine the demand for checkable deposits, policy actions can induce changes in TCD without affecting currency demand. Consequently, policy can alter the ratio of currency to ltD and, hence, the multiplier."
One might also argue that changes in the relative holding cost of the two monies are not especially relevant for explaining observed changes in the currency-to-deposit ratio. The relative holding cost of the alternative monies is given by the difference between the rates of return on the two forms of money." The return on holding currency is zero." Although non-interest-bearing checking accounts (demand deposits) have an explicit return of zero, they can yield a 'Fisher assumed that the optimal k-ratio depended on real income or wealth, the degree of development of the business sector, population density, relative holding costs and custom and habit. (Checkable deposits were thought to be "superior" to currency, although money in any form was a superior good.) Cagan (1958) extends the list of determinants of the k-ratio considerably. Both he and Hess (1971) attempt to quantify the effects of such factors. 7 Cagan (1958) recognized that, at times, restrictions might prevent the adjustment of the currency ratio. He explicitly considered the case of financial crises where banks suspended convertibility. He noted, "At these times individuals could not exchange deposits for currency, and the desired currency ratio undoubtedly exceeded the actual ratio..." Without such restrictions, however, individuals are free to adjust their currency holdings to the desired level very quickly and at a low cost. The assumption that there exists a desired currency-todeposit ratio and that individuals adjust their actual holdings of currency to their desired level was made operational for models of the money supply process by Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer in a series of articles. See Brunner (1961) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964, 1968) . effect of policy actions on economic variables such as real income or interest rates. It is argued that such variables influence the k-ratio or the other ratios that make it upparticularly, the ratio of excess reserves to total checkable deposits. See Mishkin (1989) for a more detailed discussion of this indirect effect. 'Because it is difficult to account for a relatively large amount of the total stock of U.S. currency outstanding, one should not be too surprised to tind that, in the aggregate, demand for currency and checkable deposits are not closely related. See, for example, Avery, Elliehausen, Kennickell and Spindt (1986, 1987) .
"'This potential influence is illustrated below with an example. To be sure, longer-run movements in the K-ratio might be attributable to some factors that affect the relative advantages for the two forms of money. "The discussion to follow focuses on the nonbank public's perspective. The relative holding costs to depository institutions generally will differ. "Adjusted for inflation, it is minus the expected rate of inflation. Note that currency used for illegal transactions yields a greater return because of the tax avoidance. For foreigners, currency can yield a return that diners from zero due to the appreciation or depreciation of their home currency relative to the U.S. dollar.
'It has long been recognized that policy actions can have an indirect effect on the multiplier through the presumed positive implicit return-for example, free toasters for new customers, subsidized accounting and payment services, etc. The return on holding interest-bearing checking accounts is the net interest paid on these accounts plus free paymnent services.' 3
The relative holding cost of currency and demand deposits, however, is unresponsive to movements in market interest rates because the explicit returns to both assets are identically zero. Surprisingly, the same seems to be true for currency and interest-bearing checking accounts, even since the elimination of Regulation Q ceiling rates in 1986. Interest rates paid on interest-bearing checkable deposits included in TCD have been unresponsive to movements in short-term interest rates.'
4 Despite the fact that the explicit holding cost of currency relative to that of checkable deposits has changed little, the observed ratio of currency to checkable deposits exhibited sharp swings during the 1980s. Thus, it is unlikely that changes in the public's holding of currency and checkable deposits are due primarily to changes in their relative holding cost.
The Holding qf Currency,
Checkable Deposits and Other Financial Assets
Thus, it would not appear that individuals simply shift their money holdings between currency and checkable deposits in response to variations in their relative advantages or holding cost. This conjecture would be reinforced by the fact that currency and especially checkable deposits are substitutes for other "near-money" stores of wealth, for example, money market mutual funds. From this broader perspective, the demands for currency and checkable depos-"Net interest is interest net of service charges. For a discussion of these, see Carraro and Thornton (1986) . This explicit return also could be adjusted for inflation. "Indeed, interest rates on the interest-bearing portion of TCD, called other checkable deposits (OCD), have changed little during the 1980s. The rate on OCD fluctuated between 5 percent and just over 5.5 percent during our sample period.
"This consideration raises a fundamental question-namely,
what constitutes an appropriate monetary aggregate? In theory, monetary aggregation requires the "monetary" aggregate to be "weakly separable." That is to say, it must behave as a fundamental commodity with respect to consumption and other financial assets. There can be substitution between assets that compose the aggregate, but not between those that compose the aggregate and its are seen as being determined simultaneously with the demand for near-money assets."
An important part of the determination of the ratio of currency to checkable deposits, therefore, is the degree of substitutability between currency and demand deposits on the one hand and between each of these money assets and near-money assets on the other. Although the explicit rates paid on TCD are relatively unresponsive to changes in market interest rates, rates paid on near-money assets can vary markedly with variations in other market interest rates. The effect of these variations on the proportion of Ml held in the form of currency, of course, depends on the degree of substitutability between near-money assets and the two forms of money. If currency is a relatively poor substitute for such assets while TCD is a relatively good one, the ratio of currency to TCD will change with changes in rates paid on such nearmoney assets because of changes in TCD.
The relevance of this substitutability between TCD and other near-money assets appears to have been heightened by the nationwide introduction of interest-bearing checking deposits in January 1981. Since then, the cross-price or interest elasticity of the demand for checkable deposits has increased. This increase is hardly surprising because the payment of interest on checkable deposits has made them closer substitutes for interest-bearing time and savings deposits. Indeed, some evidence suggests that individuals have shifted a significant portion of their "savings" balances into interest-bearing checking accounts." Because these saving balances are substitutes for savings and money market accounts that have higher explicit returns, the interest elasticity of the demand for checkable deposits should have risen, while the interest elasticity of currency demand should not have changed." those that do not. Some evidence suggests that, while currency and demand deposits satisfy this condition for weak separability, these two assets plus interest-bearing transaction balances do not. See, Fisher (1989) , for example. Belongia and Chalfant (1989) , among others, however, find that the data are consistent with the notion that the assets included in Ml and a grouping broader than Ml (currency and total checkable deposits) satisfy the weak separability condition. Thus, the empirical results in this line of research are not conclusive. "See Sill (1990) . "See Thornton and Stone (1991) for a derivation of this result. These results are borne out empirically by simple linear regressions of the monthly change in both currency and other checkable deposits on a scale measure and the three-month T-bill rate.
Thus, changes in interest rates, whether policy induced or not, can have an asymmetric effect on the demands for currency and checkable deposits, with a direct effect on the proportion in which the alternative monies are heldis Although this asymmetric effect is likely to have played a larger role since the introduction of interest-bearing checking accounts in generating fluctuations in the ratio of currency to TCD, policy has induced changes in this ratio more directly since the MCA (as discussed below).
•IJEPOSIT SUBSTITUTION AND THE MONEY MULTIPLIER
Provided that the demands for currency and checkable deposits are determined by factors that are independent of one another, monetary policy actions can have a direct influence on the relative holdings of each and, thus, the multiplier.'" The channel of influence is most easily illustrated in the extreme case where the demand for currency is completely independent of the demand for checkable deposits. That is, equation 5 is replaced with
where C is a constant. Equation I also can be rewritten as
where, as defined previously, K, = (C/TCD), is the observed ratio of currency to TCD. 2°U sing equations 1' and 5' in place of 1 and 5, the money supply can be written as
The crucial difference between this expression and equation 10 is that, here, policy actions atfect both the adjusted monetary base and the money multiplier. To see why, consider a policy action involving the purchase of T-bills in the market by the Fed. This policy action increases the stock of reserves and, assuming zero excess reserves, ltD. In the ea,lier formulation of his model, the K-ratio was assumed to be unchanged; the increase in TCD would be accompanied by a proportionate increase in currency, so that the observed ratio of currency to TCD, K, would not change. Thus, the effect of this policy action on the money stock would be isolated in the monetary base-the multiplier would be unaffected. ln the modified model, however, TCD increases while currency is constant. Consequently, the Kratio falls and the multiplier, m'', rises. In this instance, the change in monetary policy is reflected both in the adjusted monetary base, because of a change in R, and in the multiplier because of a policy-induced change in K. Although this argument is made in terms of a static model, the main point, that policy can influence the multiplier, would carry over into a more realistic dynamic model. 'I'wo of the more salient features of the longer-run consequences of this analysis are taken up in the shaded insert on page 54. Figure 1 shows the K-ratio and the observed adjusted monetary base multiplier, Ml/AMB, from January 1970 to November 1990. Note that the multiplier is essentially the mirror image of the K-ratio; the K-ratio accounts for much of the multiplier's short-run (month-to-month) variability and for the .significant shifts in its longer-run "trends." Indeed, as shown in table 1, changes in the K-ratio alone explain over 80 percent of the month-to-month variahility in "The same would be expected for changes in the level of income. Indeed, Hess (1971) presents estimates indicating asymmetric effects of both changes in interest rates and income on the demands for currency and checkable deposits. It should be emphasized that this effect of changes in interest rates on the k-ratio is not the same as that which was alluded to earlier--i.e., through the relative holding cost of currency and checkable deposits (see footnote 8). '"Many researchers who have estimated currency demand equations have abstracted from the relationship of currency to TCD. For example, see Hess (1971) and Dotsey (1988) .
THE RECENT BEHAVIOR OF THE K-RATIO
20 Because k is meaningless in this formulation, K, will not equal k. More generally, currency demand can be thought of as having two components, one related to TCD as embodied in the k-ratio and the other unrelated to TCD, That is, C, = C + kTCD,. In this more general formulation, the k-ratio is determined solely by the relative holding cost of currency and TCD and the substitutability between them as discussed above. Thc' sec ond evainpie assunies that the cit' on ranmietary polity and that he exact~aIue mood for corm'enc'.\' i~dih cii lat-gely In t'orres of the long-ian nmhipht'r Imt'tt\ eOO I dull 1 I exti't'0~l to the domestic ei'oiuoiny, sos. forclc'pends r-miticahl) tiii tIn' sj,t'r~I it'atlt)ilS tiE liii' vigil dttnlanrl br i-S. rurreflt'~it also asch'niand~for rLirreiw.\ and TM) an' noiit'tliestones that the domes 1 ic ciettiand 'or comm-enless~ahcl Rt'lOUt' 0 nieawngltil 'long rums cv is determtlimied ,olt'lv hs the relative represc'minltion oi the numitipliei c'ahi he ohholding cost of curretily~. id) and that tamed il is nt'n'ssai'Y to 4pt'rit~c'ai'c'fullt hi' cost is ccjnstalit. .\gain. these elationboth ilir' cic'mmianc t 'cii cllrn'iit'.\ and the tieships are assume' 1 io lie linear in the natural omnd toe IC ft-'The parameler h might be thouqht oi as the 'og of the op-~Nornthat. because the multiplier~5 bounded. Ml and AMB umal s~ratioretiecttng only the 'dative advantages and must be cointograted costs o t curuency and TCD
Figure 2
The K-Ratio, Currency and TCD Since then, changes in the K-ratio alone explain over 85 percent of changes in the multiplier.
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The Durbin-Watson statistic for each of the equations indicates significant, negative first-order serial correlation, Because we are primarily interested in the explanatory power of changes in the k-ratio as measured by the adjusted A-square, however, maximum likelihood estimates of the equations adjusted for serial correlation are not reported here. Nonetheless, there are no substantive differences between the maximum likelihood estimates and those reported in table 1.
22 See Garfinkel and Thornton (1989) for details. The Relationship Between Total Checkable Deposits and the K4latio Figure 2 shows the K-ratio, currency and TCIJ. The behavior of these series suggests that changes in the trend of the K-ratio are associated more closely with changes in the trend of TCD than with changes in the trend of currency growth. For example, the sharp rise in the K-ratio in the early 1970s is associated with a slowing in the growth of TCD. The decline in the K-ratio in the early 1980s and its subsequent rise are clearly associated with a sharp acceleration in the growth of TCD followed by a sharp deceleration in its growth.
That TCD accounts for much of the shortrun variation in the K-ratio also is evidenced by figures 3 and 4, which show, respectively, deviations of the growth rate of the K-ratio from its mean and deviations of the growth rates of currency and TCD from their respective means. As shown in the figures, the month-to-month variability in the growth of TC]J is considerably larger than that of currency. The variability of TCIIJ more closely matches the variability of the K-ratio than does the variability of currency. While the growth rates of the K-ratio and TCD are highly, inversely related, there is little positive association between the growth rate of the K-ratio and the growth rate of currency.
This observation is verified in table 2, which shows the simple correlations between the monthly annualized growth rates for currency and the K-ratio and for TCD and the K-ratio for four periods of roughly equal length between January 1970 and November 1990. tf variation in the K-ratio were simply due to shifts between currency and TCD, its variation would be equally attributable to variation in currency and TCD. This is not the case, however. The growth rates of currency and the K-ratio were positively correlated during only two of the four periods. They were negatively correlated in the other two, although the correlations are not significantly different from zero. In contrast, there is a strong, consistent negative correlation between the growth rate of TCIJ and the K-ratio during all four of the periods. Figures 3 and 4 and the correlations reported in table 2 clearly suggest that month-to-month variability in the K-ratio is driven largely by movements in TCD.
Finally, as shown in figure 4 , periods of persistent deviations in the growth rate of TCD above (below) its mean are associated with persistent deviations of the growth rate of the Kratio below (above) its mean. Consequently, both the short and long-run movements of the Kratio are associated with movements in TCD rather than currency. The apparent importance of TCD in influencing the K-ratio suggests that K-ratio changes have not occurred simply because of variations in the relative advantages and holding cost of currency and TCD. That is to say, changes in the K-ratio have not been a simple result of the public's desire to shift the composition of Ml between currency and checkable deposits.
The Link Between Total Checkable Deposits and Reserves
Movements in the multiplier appear to be determined primarily by movements in the K-ratio, which, in turn, appear to be determined primarily by changes in TCD. The question that remains is what determines the stock of TCIJ outstanding? The models of the money supply presented above provide a simple answer: given the reserve requirement ratio, TCD is determined solely by the amount of reserves supplied by the Federal Reserve. This strong link arises in this model because reserves are assumed to be held only to support checkable deposits24
Prior to the MCA, commercial member banks were required to hold reserves against all time and saving deposits, while non-member banks and other depository institutions were not required to hold reserves against their transaction deposits in Ml. Because of these factors, the link between TCD and reserves was not particularly strong. In reducing or eliminating reserve requirements on a number of non-transaction accounts and extending reserve requirements to all depository institutions, however, the MCA significantly strengthened the relationship between TCD and reserves.
The effect of the MCA is illustrated in table 3, which shows the results of simple linear regressions of changes in TCD on changes in total reserves, 'FR, for several periods between January 1970 and November 199023 The regression equations in this table (and in subsequent ones) are intended to be illustrative and should not be interpreted as alternative models for the money supply process. (See the appendix for details.) In all cases but the initial phase-in of the MCA, there is a statistically significant relationship between changes in TCD and TR. The strength of the relationship, as measured by the adjusted H-square, however, increases after the implementation of the MCA.
2°T he adjusted H-square increases from .06 before the MCA to .67 after the MCA. All of this improvement emerges in the period after February 1984, when the adjusted R-square increases further to .83.27 Moreover, the reciprocal of the estimated coefficient on TR is .124, very close to the marginal reserve requirement of .12 during the latter period. Indeed, the null hypothesis that this coefficient is equal to 1/12 cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level (the t-statistic is 0.82).
24 1n reality, of course, depository institutions hold excess reserves and are required to hold reserves on transaction deposits other than those included in Ml.
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The total reserves measure used here is total reserves adjusted for reserve requirement changes, prepared by the Federal Reserve Board. 26 The Durbin-Watson statistic for the first time period suggests that there is significant first-order positive serial correlation, as would be expected given the likelihood of misspecification (see the appendix). Maximum likelihood estimates of this equation adjusting for first-order serial correlation confirm this result. The estimated coefficient of first-order serial correlation is -.314 with a t-statistic in absolute value of 3.29. Nevertheless, the parameter estimates after adjusting for serial correlation are generally close to those reported in table 3, and they are statistically significant. More important, the adjusted A-square only increases to .147; hence, the dramatic rise in the adjusted R-square in the 1980s is not due to the fact that total reserve captures the autoregressive part of TCD.
27 The switch from lagged to contemporaneous reserve accounting in February 1984 might explain some of this apparent improvement. To account for this possibility, the change in TCD was regressed on both the contemporaneous and lagged change in TA. In no case was the coeff icient on lagged TA statistically significant from zero at the 5 percent level. Indeed, the results differed little from those reported in table 3. That the switch from lagged to contemporaneous reserve requirements is of no significant consequence is consistent with the conjecture of Thornton (1983) and the empirical evidence presented by Garfinkel and Thornton (1989) . The relationship between TR and TCD will likely become even stronger given the recent elimination of reserve requirements on all time and savings deposits. 23 TR a rather stmple traightfot n aid appi oach to explains a i'd itit cIt small amount of the~aria money stock control n as tmplied-namc It to tion in changes in Ml before MC \ and ot cc 80 target the let ci of the adjusted monetart h tse percent of the tariation of changes in Mi since consistent tt ith a money stock target conditional early 1984. 'the table also shott s that the cxon a for cc ist of the multiplier, n her e the multi plar~atory potter of the monetary base has inplier foreca t itas not conditional on the target creased since the 1CA. as n ould be etpected.~setting for the monetary base. I his notion also \onetheless the explanatort pon er of the IAMB implied that the adjusted monetary base is the declined significantly m elatit e to that of I H. be t indicator of the effects of polict actions on the money stock.
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The realization that the multiplier is not in-I dependent of pohct actions suggests that the monetary ba -e might not be the best indicator Prior to the MCz\ tthen it appeared that the of policy actions on the monet stock and that multiplier st as independent of policy actions ret ising the simple empirical models of the 8 Again the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate significant that changes in TA explain much more of the variation in serial correlation, especially when the AMB is used as the changes in Ml in the 1980s than do changes in the AMB independent variable. In no case did an adlustment for even allowing for significant first-order serial correlation. seria] correlation using a maximum likelihood technique 29 5ee Garfinkel and Thornton (1989) for a discussion of this alter any of the substantive results presented in table 5 r~oint That is these results too suggest that there is a marked increase in the explanatory power of TA in the 1980s and money supply process to account for the effects of policy actions on the multiplier could result in improved money stock control. These issues ace discussed briefly in this section.
The Adjusted Monetary Base as an .Indica for of Police Actions on the Money Stock
The adjusted monetary base continues to reflect all policy actions-changes in both reserves and reserve requirements; however, it does not fully capture the effects of these actions on the money stock. Indeed, changes in Ml are now more closely linked to changes in TB than to changes in the IAMB. Consequently, it now appears that total reserves, adjusted for reserve requirement changes, is a better indicator of the effects of monetary policy actions on the money supply than is the adjusted monetary base.
Furthermore, the quantity of currency outstanding is demand-determined. Consequently, unlike adjusted reserves, the adjusted monetary base can give misleading signals of the course of monetary policy when there are exogenous shifts in the demand for currency.
To take a concrete example, currency growth accelerated markedly beginning about December 1989.~°This acceleration was accompanied by a sharp acceleration in the growth of the adjusted monetary base from 3.4 percent in 1989 to 8.4 percent in 1990. Such a sharp rise in base growth would tend to indicate that monetary policy had eased. But the growth of adjusted reserves and, thus, 'I'CD indicate a substantially weaker easing of policy. TCD increased at a 1.2 percent rate in 1990 compared with a -1.3 percent rate in 1989. Of course, the apparent exogenous increase in the demand for currency caused the K-ratio to rise and the multiplier to fall, so that Mi grew slowly relative to the monetary base during the period." Because there is now a closer link between TB and MI than between the IAMB and Ml and because TB is less likely to give misleading signals, TB is likely to be a better indicator of both monetary policy and the effects of policy changes on the money stock.
The Multiplier .zI.pproach to Money Stock Control
That the multiplier is not independent of policy actions also has important implications for the multiplier approach to money stock control. Taking this approach, the target level of Ml is achieved by forecasting the multiplier, then supplying the amount of the adjusted monetary base necessary to hit the desired Ml target-32 lf, however', the multiplier is a function of open market operations, policymakers must also predict the effect of their actions on the multiplier. That is to say, the multiplier approach to money control should be modified to take account of the effects of policy actions on the multiplier. Taking account of such effects undoubtedly will improve money control over the simple approach that assumes independence between the multiplier and policy actions. The magnitude of this improvement depends on how accurately the effects of policy actions on the multiplier can be forecast. To the extent that variations in the multiplier ace largely explained by variations in the k-ratio and these variations are, in turn, largely influenced by policy (especially in the post-MCA period), such a modification could produce a substantial improvement in money stock control." An equally interesting, but less frequently discussed, episode occurred during 1989 when, after remaining fairly constant, currency growth slowed abruptly. During this period, the K-ratio rose rather than fell, as one might expect given the apparent shift in the demand for currency. The increase in the K-ratio was driven by negative growth in reserves and, hence, TCD during this period.
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5ee Balbach (1981) , Hafer, Hem and Kool (1983) , and Johannes and Rasche (1979, 1987) for a discussion of this approach and for alternative methods that have been used to forecast the money multiplier. "Note that the multiplier approach can be more difficult to implement. Most notably, the control problem becomes nonlinear. One alternative approach would be to simply forecast the level of currency, then supply the reserves necessary to hit a target level of TCD. The target level of TCD would have to be consistent with both the Ml target and the forecast level of currency. Whether this or the multiplier approach, suitably modified to account for the effect of policy actions on the multiplier, would provide greater monetary control is an empirical issue well beyond the scope of this paper. Both approaches will produce forecast errors when there are unexpected shifts in the demand for currency. The real issue is whether better estimates of the K-ratio can be obtained by estimating the numerator and denominators separately than estimating them together. This is an empirical issue. Nevertheless, this alternative approach could be simpler to implement and might provide superior control if reasonably accurate forecasts of currency can be made.
SUMMARY
This article has examined closely the standard multiplier model of the money supply process, specifically questioning the view that the adjusted monetary base multiplier is independent of the policy actions of the central bank. Because the demand for currency depends on a number of factors that are unrelated to the demand for checkable deposits (and vice versa) and because the stock of checkable deposits has been more closely tied to the quantity of reserves supplied by the Federal Reserve since the implementation of the MCA, changes in monetary policy result in changes in the ratio of currency to checkable deposits and, consequently, changes in the multiplier. Hence, the Federal Reserve's monetary policy actions are reflected both in the adjusted monetary base and the money multiplier.
Theoretical considerations suggest that the multiplier has never been independent of policy. The elimination of reserve requirements on some non-transaction accounts and the extension of Federal Reserve reserve requirements to all depository institutions has greatly increased the association between checkable deposits and reserves. These changes have increased significantly the association between changes in monetary policy actions and changes in the multiplier. That the multiplier is affected by policy actions suggests that money stock control using the multiplier model would be enhanced by taking the effect of policy actions on the multiplier into account. How much improvement can be expected with this modified approach and how effective alternative approaches to monetary control can be is left as a topic for further research. Absolute values oft statistics are in parentheses A.4. In the former case the estimate of h is bias-TCD and currency, but is not significantly difed downward (4.005 vs. 8.33) ; in the latter case fecent from zero. Given this independence, it is the estimate of j is biased upward (4.005 vs. 1).
hardly surprising that cegre sions of changes in Furthermore, the equation exhibits serial corMi on TB and changes in TCD on JR produce relation, a common indicator of misspecification.
nearly identical r'e ults. Comparing the results These results are not too surprising given that in table A.i with those in table 5 hows that the the demand for currency appears to be indepen coefficient is biased downward slightly when dent of the demand for TCD, a illustrated in Ml is regressed on TB I his occurs because C', table AZ, which shows the result of a cegcesis omitted from the right-hand side of the equasion of changes in TCD on changes in I B and tion and because of the weak negati~e associachanges in C. The coefficient on the change in tion between changes in both C,and TCD, and, C is negative, indicating a substitution between hence, changes in TB, -
